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RESPONSE
EX PARTE YOUNG AFIER
SEMINOLE TRIBE
DAVID P. CuRm*
My message is one of calm placidity: Not to worry; Ex parte
Young1 is alive and well and living in the Supreme Court.
By way of background let me say that I am that rara avis, a law
professor who thinks Hans v. Louisiana2 was rightly decided.3 For the
reasons given by Justice Bradley,4 I am quite convinced that the Fed-
eral Question Clause of Article III does not extend the judicial power
to suits against nonconsenting states. That being so, it follows that the
much lamented first half of the decision in Seminole Tribe v. Floridas
is also right, for a long series of decisions makes abundantly clear that
Congress cannot give the federal courts jurisdiction over matters
outside Article 1l.6
Nor do I consider Ex parte Young, as Justice Souter does in his
dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe, as an obvious corollary of
Hans.7 On the contrary, Ex parte Young squarely contradicts that de-
cision. For even if sovereign immunity was only a matter of form in
* Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
B.A., University of Chicago; LL.B., Harvard. This Comment is based upon remarks made
during a panel discussion at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in January 1997.
1 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that judicial power of United States does not extend to
suits against state by one of its own citizens unless state consents to be sued).
3 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century,
1888-1986, at 7-9 (1990).
4 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-18.
5 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119-32 (1996).
6 See, e.g., National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater 'Ikansfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 12 (1800). There is
not much to be said even for Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which concluded
that Congress could make states suable under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment;
that section came after the Eighth Amendment as well as the Eleventh, but that does not
mean Congress may authorize cruel and unusual punishments to enforce the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. See Currie, supra note 3, at 573-74.
7 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1178 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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England,8 it meant enough to our founding generation that they rose
up to smite the Supreme Court when it had the audacity to permit
suits against states.9 One does not go to the trouble of amending the
Constitution in order to alter the caption on the complaint.' 0
Frankly, I find this quite deplorable. Sovereign immunity is a rot-
ten idea. If states commit wrongs, they should be accountable for
them. As Ex parte Young recognized, constitutional rights cannot ad-
equately be assured without judicial remedies against states or their
officers. But, as our first President reminded us, if the Constitution is
defective it should be amended, not ignored; twisting the Constitution
is not good for the rule of law."
Now what about Seminole Tribe's additional holding that the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act precluded suit against the Governor
under Ex parte Young?12
1) There is nothing startling in the notion that a statute providing
some remedies for the violation of federal law impliedly precludes
others. It happens all the time. In recent years, specific statutory re-
medial schemes have been held to preclude federal common law rem-
edies,13 Bivens remedies,14 section 1983 remedies,15 federal question 16
and supplementary jurisdiction17 over state law remedies, and state
remedies themselves.' 8 Indeed, there will be cases in which such an
inference is entirely plausible. Professor Jackson is quite right that the
fact that the plaintiff has no remedy does not mean that the suit was
against the state,' 9 as the Court said it was;20 the complaint might have
8 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789-1888, at 19-20 (1985) (discussing Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793)); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 197 (1965).
9 See U.S. Const. amend. XI.
10 See Currie, supra note 8, at 104-05 (discussing Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
11 See Washington's Farewell Address, in 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents 213, 220 (James D. Richardson ed., 1900).
12 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24.
13 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (11), 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981).
14 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
15 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
11 (1981).
16 See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
17 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
18 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990).
19 See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment and the Potential
Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495, 520 (1997) (arguing that "Court
might have analyzed the statute to conclude that it authorized no cause of action against
the Governor-but that determination does not go to whether the suit against the Gover-
nor is one against the State").
20 Seminole Thbe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1996).
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been dismissed for failure to state a claim.21 But that is a cosmetic
flaw. Doctrinally speaking, Seminole Tribe was just another applica-
tion of the Sea Clammers22 principle that specific statutory remedies
may preempt actions under section 1983,P for Exparte Young today is
a section 1983 case.
2) There is no reason to distinguish for this purpose between Ex
parte Young and Bivens, 4 as Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe
would have us do.25 In Bivens itself, to answer the difficult question
of where the Court got the authority to create a damage remedy for
victims of federal constitutional wrongs, Justice Harlan relied on cases
like Ex parte Young. If the Court may invent equitable remedies
against officers, Justice Harlan argued, it may invent legal remedies
too. Since Bivens and Exparte Young have the same pedigree, they
are subject to the same possibilities of preclusion.
3) Congress is perfectly free to abolish the remedy recognized by
Ex parte Young. Henry Hart was right that Marbury v. Madison27
makes clear that judicial review is an essential part of the constitu-
tional system of checks and balances;2 if constitutional limitations are
to be enforced, neither Congress nor the states may be the ultimate
judges of their own powers. Thus, there would be serious constitu-
tional difficulties were Congress to close all courts to questions of the
constitutionality of state laws or, given the special role the framers
contemplated for the Supreme Court, to strip that Court of its essen-
tial jurisdiction.
But to abolish the Ex parte Young remedy closes only the district
courts and only to anticipatory relief, which is important but hardly
required, even in constitutional cases. We got along without it until
the 1870s absent the accident of diverse citizenship or a special statu-
21 Jackson, supra note 19, at 520-21.
22 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
24 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 383
(1971).
25 116 S. Ct. at 1181-82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring). The analogy was not perfect Equi-
table remedies were originally based on the fact that the Practice Conformity Act of 1872,
ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, which required federal courts to follow state procedures in
common law cases, allowed them to develop their own equitable remedies. But that provi-
sion seems to have disappeared when Congress empowered the Supreme Court to promul-
gate federal procedural rules. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C § 2071 (1994).
The sources of legal and equitable remedies are now identical
27 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953) (citing Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
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tory provision,29 since there was no general federal question jurisdic-
tion. And even if the substantive provisions of the Constitution were
construed to require anticipatory district court relief today, it would
not help in Seminole Tribe, for that case involved only statutory rights,
not the Constitution.30
4) That said, application of the Sea Clammers principle in Semi-
nole Tribe makes no sense. The majority held Ex parte Young pre-
cluded by a provision it had just declared unconstitutional-the
section authorizing suit against the state itself.31 One of the essential
characteristics of unconstitutional provisions is that they have no ef-
fect. Moreover, the inability to make the state suable removes the
only plausible basis for believing that Congress would have wanted to
forbid suit against the Governor under Ex parte Young. The Congress
that enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act32 did its best to ex-
pand remedies for violation of its provisions; the last thing that Con-
gress would have wanted was to leave the offended party with no
remedy at all.
5) The sixty-four-thousand-dollar question is what effect Semi-
nole Tribe's restriction of Ex parte Young will have on other cases. In
my opinion, very little. The most important cases are those like Ex
parte Young itself, involving constitutional claims against state of-
ficers. No statute even conceivably precludes such suits. Far from
providing a distinct set of remedies, section 1983 expressly authorizes
suits in equity against those who violate constitutional rights under
color of state law33-i.e., the remedy given in Ex parte Young. Semi-
nole Tribe is no more a threat to Ex parte Young itself than was Sea
Clammers, which has not impeded the enforcement of constitutional
rights under section 1983.
6) As an original matter one might argue with some degree of
plausibility that section 1983 impliedly bars judicially created reme-
dies for the constitutional wrongs of federal officers, since it fails to
mention them. Not so long ago the Court bought the equally flimsy
argument that by not providing a remedy against local governments,
that statute implicitly precluded supplemental jurisdiction to enforce
state law.34 But Justice Black made exactly that argument in Bivens,35
29 Such as existed, for example, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 816 (1824) (finding jurisdiction conferred by act of Congress incorporating
Bank of the United States).
30 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
31 See id.
32 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 & 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-68 (1994)).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
34 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976).
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the Court rejected it, and Seminole Tribe does not make it stronger.
The fact is that in enacting remedies to protect federal rights from
state infringement, Congress was not thinking about federal officers,
one way or the other.3 6
7) Like Sea Clammers, Seminole Tribe vill have its most signifi-
cant effect on actions involving statutory, not constitutional rights.
The test will be the same as in Sea Clammers: Does the statutory
scheme evince a congressional design to preclude the remedy ordina-
rily afforded by section 1983? But a recent Ninth Circuit opinion
shows that the answer may not always be the same: While the citizen-
suit provision of the Clean Water Act precludes a section 1983 action
for damages,3 7 it contemplates injunctive suits against state officers,
for the legislative history shows that Congress meant to afford such
relief to the extent permitted by the Constitution. 8
8) In short, the impact of Seminole Tribe upon Ex parte Young
remedies turns on analysis of the terms, history, purpose, and context
of the remedial provisions of the particular statute sought to be en-
forced. Thus, Seminole Tribe may well preclude the use of Ex parte
Young in additional cases involving statutory rights. As I have said,
there is nothing new about that in principle, as other types of remedies
have often been precluded for identical reasons.3 9 Indeed, it would be
no great tragedy if the Court were to push Seminole Tribe so far as to
overrule the holding in Maine v. ThiboutotO that section 1983 pro-
vides remedies for the violation of federal statutes in general, for as
the dissent in that case demonstrated, that provision was meant to
have no such effect. 41
But the bottom line is you should relax; Seminole Tribe is no
threat to Ex parte Young as a crucial remedy for the protection of
constitutional rights.
35 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
36 The Court has also rightly rejected the argument that Congress implicitly overruled
Bivens by amending the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994), to make the
United States liable for intentional wrongs committed in the course of law enforcement.
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
37 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1365 (1994).
38 See National Resources Defense Council v. California Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420
(9th Cir. 1996).
39 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
40 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
41 See id. at 14-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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